The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment

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Standard

The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment. / Julien, Benoit; Kennes, John; King, Ian.

I: Economics Letters, Bind 90, Nr. 2, 2006, s. 149-155.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Julien, B, Kennes, J & King, I 2006, 'The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment', Economics Letters, bind 90, nr. 2, s. 149-155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.019

APA

Julien, B., Kennes, J., & King, I. (2006). The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment. Economics Letters, 90(2), 149-155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.019

Vancouver

Julien B, Kennes J, King I. The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment. Economics Letters. 2006;90(2):149-155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.019

Author

Julien, Benoit ; Kennes, John ; King, Ian. / The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment. I: Economics Letters. 2006 ; Bind 90, Nr. 2. s. 149-155.

Bibtex

@article{ec98766089f111dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment",
abstract = "We apply the efficiency axioms of [Mortensen, D. (1982). Efficiency of mating, racing and related games. American Economic Review, 72 968–979.] to a set of matching games involving coordination frictions between buyers. These games include markets with finite numbers of buyers and sellers and markets with infinite numbers of heterogeneous buyers and homogenous sellers. We show that the Mortensen rule, but not the Hosios rule, gives constrained efficient allocations. We also show that the Mortensen rule is implemented by a simple auction",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Hosios rule, Mortensen rule, auctions",
author = "Benoit Julien and John Kennes and Ian King",
note = "JEL Classification: C78",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.019",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "149--155",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment

AU - Julien, Benoit

AU - Kennes, John

AU - King, Ian

N1 - JEL Classification: C78

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - We apply the efficiency axioms of [Mortensen, D. (1982). Efficiency of mating, racing and related games. American Economic Review, 72 968–979.] to a set of matching games involving coordination frictions between buyers. These games include markets with finite numbers of buyers and sellers and markets with infinite numbers of heterogeneous buyers and homogenous sellers. We show that the Mortensen rule, but not the Hosios rule, gives constrained efficient allocations. We also show that the Mortensen rule is implemented by a simple auction

AB - We apply the efficiency axioms of [Mortensen, D. (1982). Efficiency of mating, racing and related games. American Economic Review, 72 968–979.] to a set of matching games involving coordination frictions between buyers. These games include markets with finite numbers of buyers and sellers and markets with infinite numbers of heterogeneous buyers and homogenous sellers. We show that the Mortensen rule, but not the Hosios rule, gives constrained efficient allocations. We also show that the Mortensen rule is implemented by a simple auction

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Hosios rule

KW - Mortensen rule

KW - auctions

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.019

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.019

M3 - Journal article

VL - 90

SP - 149

EP - 155

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 314003