The Mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

  • Benoit Julien
  • John Kennes
  • Ian King
We apply the efficiency axioms of [Mortensen, D. (1982). Efficiency of mating, racing and related games. American Economic Review, 72 968–979.] to a set of matching games involving coordination frictions between buyers. These games include markets with finite numbers of buyers and sellers and markets with infinite numbers of heterogeneous buyers and homogenous sellers. We show that the Mortensen rule, but not the Hosios rule, gives constrained efficient allocations. We also show that the Mortensen rule is implemented by a simple auction
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEconomics Letters
Vol/bind90
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)149-155
ISSN0165-1765
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2006

Bibliografisk note

JEL Classification: C78

ID: 314003