The Strategic Nature of Compliance: An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union.

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Standard

The Strategic Nature of Compliance : An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union. . / König, Thomas; Mäder, Lars Kai.

I: American Journal of Political Science, Bind 58, Nr. 1, 01.01.2014, s. 246–263.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

König, T & Mäder, LK 2014, 'The Strategic Nature of Compliance: An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union. ', American Journal of Political Science, bind 58, nr. 1, s. 246–263. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12038

APA

König, T., & Mäder, L. K. (2014). The Strategic Nature of Compliance: An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union. . American Journal of Political Science, 58(1), 246–263. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12038

Vancouver

König T, Mäder LK. The Strategic Nature of Compliance: An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union. . American Journal of Political Science. 2014 jan. 1;58(1):246–263. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12038

Author

König, Thomas ; Mäder, Lars Kai. / The Strategic Nature of Compliance : An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union. . I: American Journal of Political Science. 2014 ; Bind 58, Nr. 1. s. 246–263.

Bibtex

@article{ee1dce1ff4c2480b812bbac622a362c6,
title = "The Strategic Nature of Compliance: An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union. ",
abstract = "This compliance study models correct and timely implementation of policies in a multilevel system as a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers and evaluates statistically the empirical implications of this model. We test whether compliance is determined by the anticipated enforcement decision of the monitoring agency and whether this agency is responsive to the probability of enforcement success and the potential sanctioning costs produced by noncomplying implementers. Compared to other monitoring systems, the centralized monitoring system of the European Union (EU) is praised for exemplary effectiveness, but our findings reveal that the monitoring agency refrains from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is low, and the sanctioning costs are high. This results in a compliance deficit, even though the selective enforcement activities of the monitoring agency are almost always successful before court.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, COMPLIANCE, EUROPEAN Union law, EUROPEAN integration, SANCTIONS (International law)",
author = "Thomas K{\"o}nig and M{\"a}der, {Lars Kai}",
year = "2014",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/ajps.12038",
language = "English",
volume = "58",
pages = "246–263",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0092-5853",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Strategic Nature of Compliance

T2 - An Empirical Evaluation of Law Implementation in the Central Monitoring System of the European Union.

AU - König, Thomas

AU - Mäder, Lars Kai

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - This compliance study models correct and timely implementation of policies in a multilevel system as a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers and evaluates statistically the empirical implications of this model. We test whether compliance is determined by the anticipated enforcement decision of the monitoring agency and whether this agency is responsive to the probability of enforcement success and the potential sanctioning costs produced by noncomplying implementers. Compared to other monitoring systems, the centralized monitoring system of the European Union (EU) is praised for exemplary effectiveness, but our findings reveal that the monitoring agency refrains from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is low, and the sanctioning costs are high. This results in a compliance deficit, even though the selective enforcement activities of the monitoring agency are almost always successful before court.

AB - This compliance study models correct and timely implementation of policies in a multilevel system as a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers and evaluates statistically the empirical implications of this model. We test whether compliance is determined by the anticipated enforcement decision of the monitoring agency and whether this agency is responsive to the probability of enforcement success and the potential sanctioning costs produced by noncomplying implementers. Compared to other monitoring systems, the centralized monitoring system of the European Union (EU) is praised for exemplary effectiveness, but our findings reveal that the monitoring agency refrains from enforcing compliance when the probability of success is low, and the sanctioning costs are high. This results in a compliance deficit, even though the selective enforcement activities of the monitoring agency are almost always successful before court.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - COMPLIANCE

KW - EUROPEAN Union law

KW - EUROPEAN integration

KW - SANCTIONS (International law)

U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12038

DO - 10.1111/ajps.12038

M3 - Journal article

VL - 58

SP - 246

EP - 263

JO - American Journal of Political Science

JF - American Journal of Political Science

SN - 0092-5853

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 141704814