The Lure of the Private Sector: Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

Standard

The Lure of the Private Sector : Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate. / Egerod, Benjamin Carl Krag.

2017.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

Harvard

Egerod, BCK 2017, 'The Lure of the Private Sector: Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate'.

APA

Egerod, B. C. K. (2017). The Lure of the Private Sector: Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate.

Vancouver

Egerod BCK. The Lure of the Private Sector: Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate. 2017.

Author

Egerod, Benjamin Carl Krag. / The Lure of the Private Sector : Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate. 34 s.

Bibtex

@conference{b491ee5fbe7f4eb6940c5ce5ba55e24e,
title = "The Lure of the Private Sector: Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate",
abstract = "While it is often conjectured that elected politicians take lobbying jobs to cash in on their political experience, no quantitative evidence has been collected to investigate this proposition. I argue that legislators gauge their own career prospects by observing how successful their former colleagues -- who now work as lobbyists -- are. I document that when private sector career prospects improve, so does the probability that the average US senator leaves office to take a lobbying job. There is no effect immediately before a senator's pension scheme improves, and senators, who retire from working life after Congress or are elected to a safe seat, are unaffected by private sector career prospects. This indicates that senators react to opportunity costs associated with being in office. Finally, while the results suggest that certain ideological types are more attracted by private sector rewards than others, low turnover in the Senate makes it unlikely that the revolving door has changed the composition of the chamber.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Revolving door politics, Voluntary retirement, US Senate, US Congress, Elite Careers, Special interest groups, Lobbying",
author = "Egerod, {Benjamin Carl Krag}",
year = "2017",
language = "English",

}

RIS

TY - CONF

T1 - The Lure of the Private Sector

T2 - Career prospects affect the selection out of the Senate

AU - Egerod, Benjamin Carl Krag

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - While it is often conjectured that elected politicians take lobbying jobs to cash in on their political experience, no quantitative evidence has been collected to investigate this proposition. I argue that legislators gauge their own career prospects by observing how successful their former colleagues -- who now work as lobbyists -- are. I document that when private sector career prospects improve, so does the probability that the average US senator leaves office to take a lobbying job. There is no effect immediately before a senator's pension scheme improves, and senators, who retire from working life after Congress or are elected to a safe seat, are unaffected by private sector career prospects. This indicates that senators react to opportunity costs associated with being in office. Finally, while the results suggest that certain ideological types are more attracted by private sector rewards than others, low turnover in the Senate makes it unlikely that the revolving door has changed the composition of the chamber.

AB - While it is often conjectured that elected politicians take lobbying jobs to cash in on their political experience, no quantitative evidence has been collected to investigate this proposition. I argue that legislators gauge their own career prospects by observing how successful their former colleagues -- who now work as lobbyists -- are. I document that when private sector career prospects improve, so does the probability that the average US senator leaves office to take a lobbying job. There is no effect immediately before a senator's pension scheme improves, and senators, who retire from working life after Congress or are elected to a safe seat, are unaffected by private sector career prospects. This indicates that senators react to opportunity costs associated with being in office. Finally, while the results suggest that certain ideological types are more attracted by private sector rewards than others, low turnover in the Senate makes it unlikely that the revolving door has changed the composition of the chamber.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Revolving door politics

KW - Voluntary retirement

KW - US Senate

KW - US Congress

KW - Elite Careers

KW - Special interest groups

KW - Lobbying

M3 - Paper

ER -

ID: 184669697