Reputational cheap talk

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Standard

Reputational cheap talk. / Ottaviani, Marco; Sørensen, Peter Norman.

I: RAND Journal of Economics, Bind 37, Nr. 1, 2006, s. 155-175.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Ottaviani, M & Sørensen, PN 2006, 'Reputational cheap talk', RAND Journal of Economics, bind 37, nr. 1, s. 155-175. <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=1105985131&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=16141&RQT=309&VName=PQD>

APA

Ottaviani, M., & Sørensen, P. N. (2006). Reputational cheap talk. RAND Journal of Economics, 37(1), 155-175. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=1105985131&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=16141&RQT=309&VName=PQD

Vancouver

Ottaviani M, Sørensen PN. Reputational cheap talk. RAND Journal of Economics. 2006;37(1):155-175.

Author

Ottaviani, Marco ; Sørensen, Peter Norman. / Reputational cheap talk. I: RAND Journal of Economics. 2006 ; Bind 37, Nr. 1. s. 155-175.

Bibtex

@article{e415f5a08f5811dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Reputational cheap talk",
abstract = "We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, reputation, equilibrium",
author = "Marco Ottaviani and S{\o}rensen, {Peter Norman}",
note = "JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83",
year = "2006",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "155--175",
journal = "RAND Journal of Economics",
issn = "0741-6261",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reputational cheap talk

AU - Ottaviani, Marco

AU - Sørensen, Peter Norman

N1 - JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others

AB - We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - reputation

KW - equilibrium

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 155

EP - 175

JO - RAND Journal of Economics

JF - RAND Journal of Economics

SN - 0741-6261

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 314073