“Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”

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“Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”. / Schuman, Boaz.

I: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Schuman, B 2023, '“Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”', British Journal for the History of Philosophy.

APA

Schuman, B. (Accepteret/In press). “Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”. British Journal for the History of Philosophy.

Vancouver

Schuman B. “Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 2023.

Author

Schuman, Boaz. / “Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”. I: British Journal for the History of Philosophy. 2023.

Bibtex

@article{1a48a8f685634d46b1cdb9c8c45c512f,
title = "“Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”",
abstract = "Spoken sentences have parts. Therefore they take time to speak. For instance, when you say, “Socrates is running”, you begin by uttering the subject term ({"}Socrates{"}), before carrying on to the predicate. But are the corresponding predications in thought also composite? And are such thoughts extended across time, like their spoken counterparts? Peter Abelard gave an affirmative response to both questions. Alberic of Paris denied the first and, as a corollary, denied the second. Here, I first set out Abelard{\textquoteright}s account. I then present a series of arguments against Abelard, reconstructed from (sometimes fragmentary) manuscripts associated with Alberic{\textquoteright}s school. I conclude with an observation about present philosophy of language: this twelfth-century debate points to some undefended (and largely unstated) assumptions common to our latest thinking about propositions. I highlight this by presenting recent accounts of two philosophers with radically different outlooks: Jeffrey King and Peter Hanks. Both their accounts take many of",
author = "Boaz Schuman",
year = "2023",
language = "English",
journal = "British Journal for the History of Philosophy",
issn = "0960-8788",
publisher = "Routledge",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - “Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!”

AU - Schuman, Boaz

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - Spoken sentences have parts. Therefore they take time to speak. For instance, when you say, “Socrates is running”, you begin by uttering the subject term ("Socrates"), before carrying on to the predicate. But are the corresponding predications in thought also composite? And are such thoughts extended across time, like their spoken counterparts? Peter Abelard gave an affirmative response to both questions. Alberic of Paris denied the first and, as a corollary, denied the second. Here, I first set out Abelard’s account. I then present a series of arguments against Abelard, reconstructed from (sometimes fragmentary) manuscripts associated with Alberic’s school. I conclude with an observation about present philosophy of language: this twelfth-century debate points to some undefended (and largely unstated) assumptions common to our latest thinking about propositions. I highlight this by presenting recent accounts of two philosophers with radically different outlooks: Jeffrey King and Peter Hanks. Both their accounts take many of

AB - Spoken sentences have parts. Therefore they take time to speak. For instance, when you say, “Socrates is running”, you begin by uttering the subject term ("Socrates"), before carrying on to the predicate. But are the corresponding predications in thought also composite? And are such thoughts extended across time, like their spoken counterparts? Peter Abelard gave an affirmative response to both questions. Alberic of Paris denied the first and, as a corollary, denied the second. Here, I first set out Abelard’s account. I then present a series of arguments against Abelard, reconstructed from (sometimes fragmentary) manuscripts associated with Alberic’s school. I conclude with an observation about present philosophy of language: this twelfth-century debate points to some undefended (and largely unstated) assumptions common to our latest thinking about propositions. I highlight this by presenting recent accounts of two philosophers with radically different outlooks: Jeffrey King and Peter Hanks. Both their accounts take many of

M3 - Journal article

JO - British Journal for the History of Philosophy

JF - British Journal for the History of Philosophy

SN - 0960-8788

ER -

ID: 375141557