A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest
TidsskriftEuropean Economic Review
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)469-485
StatusUdgivet - 2006

Bibliografisk note

JEL Classification: D31, D63, D72

ID: 314125