A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy

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Standard

A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy. / Tyran, Jean-Robert; Sausgruber, Rupert.

I: European Economic Review, Bind 50, Nr. 2, 2006, s. 469-485.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Tyran, J-R & Sausgruber, R 2006, 'A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy', European Economic Review, bind 50, nr. 2, s. 469-485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014

APA

Tyran, J-R., & Sausgruber, R. (2006). A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy. European Economic Review, 50(2), 469-485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014

Vancouver

Tyran J-R, Sausgruber R. A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy. European Economic Review. 2006;50(2):469-485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014

Author

Tyran, Jean-Robert ; Sausgruber, Rupert. / A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy. I: European Economic Review. 2006 ; Bind 50, Nr. 2. s. 469-485.

Bibtex

@article{6138aab08abc11dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy",
abstract = "We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, fairness, voting, redistribution",
author = "Jean-Robert Tyran and Rupert Sausgruber",
note = "JEL Classification: D31, D63, D72",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014",
language = "English",
volume = "50",
pages = "469--485",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

AU - Sausgruber, Rupert

N1 - JEL Classification: D31, D63, D72

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest

AB - We use a model of self-centered inequality aversion suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (Quart. J. Econom. 114 (3) (1999) 817) to study voting on redistribution. We theoretically identify two classes of conditions when an empirically plausible amount of fairness preferences induces redistribution through referenda. We test the predictions of the adapted inequality aversion model in a simple redistribution experiment and find that it predicts voting outcomes far better than the standard model of voting assuming rationality and strict self-interest

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - fairness

KW - voting

KW - redistribution

U2 - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014

DO - 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.09.014

M3 - Journal article

VL - 50

SP - 469

EP - 485

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 314125